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Number 1] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
affords only compensatory awards and behavior that warrants punitive
damages.
PROCEDURE-SERVICE OF PROCESS-PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
RULE 4(c) CRITICIZED. Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1979). The
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States (Advisory Committee) has proposed a major
amendment to the federal rules governing who may serve process in
federal courts.' Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pres-
ently requires that a United States marshal, his deputy, or a special
court appointee serve process.' The proposed amendment would ex-
tend rule 4(c) by also permitting service at the plaintiffs election "by a
person authorized to serve process by any statute or rule of the state in
which the district court is held or in which service is made."'3
Through the amendment the Advisory Committee seeks to eliminate
a "troublesome ambiguity" '4 within rule 4. While the current rule 4(c)
requires service of process by a United States marshal, rules 4(d)(7) 5
i. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF "THE UNITED STATES, REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (Feb. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT PROPOSAL].
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c) provides:
By Whom Served. Service of all process shall be made by a United States marshal, by
his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, except
that a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45. Special appointments to serve
process shall be made freely when substantial savings in travel fees will result.
3. DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at I. Amended rule 4(c) would read:
By Whom Served. Service of process shall be made by a United States marshal, by his
deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, except that
a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45. Special appointments to serve process
shall be made freely. At the election of the plaintiff service of process may be made by a
person authorized to serve process by any statute or rule of the state in which the district
court is held or in which service is made.
4. Id. at 2. See Farr & Co. v Cia. Intercontinental de Nay. de Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342 (2d
Cir. 1957); Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1956); Bonan v. Leach, 22 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Ill.
1957); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1083, at 334 (1969 &
Supp, 1978).
5. FED. R. CiV. P. 4(d)(7) provides:
(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivi-
sion of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the
manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state in which the district court is held for the service of summons or other like
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and 4(e)6 permit service in the manner prescribed by the laws and rules
of the state in which the district court is located. The 1963 Advisory
Committee Note to rule 4(d)(7) 7 expressed the intent that the rules gov-
erning the manner of service be unrestricted by rule 4(c)'s prescription
of service by a federal official,8 but rule 4(c) has the force of statute;9 its
clear language resists alteration by mere expressions of intent. t0 Thus,
the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 4(d)(7) only exacerbated the
ambiguity within rule 4" and, as a consequence of this confusing statu-
process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdic-
tion of that state.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for
service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not
an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held, service may
be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order,
or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated
in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of
summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service
upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the
attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state,
service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed in the statute or rule.
7. 28 U.S.C. app. - Rules of Civil Procedure (1976).
8. Id. The Advisory Committee notes:
It has also been held that the clause of paragraph (7) which permits service "in the man-
ner prescribed by the law of the state," etc., is not limited by subidivision (c) requiring
that service of all process be made by certain designated persons. See Farr & Co. P. Cia.
Intereontinental de Nai'. de Cuba [243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957)]. But cf. Sappla v. Lauro
Lines, 130 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
The salutary results of these cases are intended to be preserved.
Id.
9. E.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941); John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal
Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1942); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244
F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Oster v. Dominion of Canada, 144 F. Supp. 746, 748 (N.D.N.Y.),
afd sub nom. Clay v. Dominion of Canada, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936
(1956); C.J. Wieland & Son Dairy Prods. Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Wis. 1945). See
Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966);
Rumsey v. George E. Failing Co., 333 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1964); Clark County v. City of Los
Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 28, 31-32 (D. Nev. 1950); 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 69.04[2] (2d ed.
1978). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) ("All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.").
10. See C.J. Wieland & Son Dairy Prods. Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Wis. 1945)
(Advisory Committee Notes considered persuasive, but not mandatory authority).
11. Courts and commentators have urged the adoption of a clarifying amendment. See, e.g.,
Veeck v. Commodity Enterprises, Inc., 487 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion); 4
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1092 (1969 & Supp. 1978); 42
NOTRE DAME LAW. 284, 290 (1966).
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tory guidance, courts have inconsistently applied the federal rules.12
Some courts, in both early' 3 and recent' 4 interpretations of rule 4(c),
have required that all process, regardless of the manner allowed by
other subdivisions of rule 4, be served by persons designated in rule
4(c).' 5 In one case the court held that only a rule 4(c) person could
serve process even though state law permitted service by mail. 6
The court in Ospina v. Vanelli,17 in contrast, did not confine service
12. See notes 13-22 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Sappia v. Lauro Lines, 130 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Accord, Dehne v. Hillman
Inv. Co.. 110 F.2d 456 (3rd Cir. 1940); Myers v. Slotkin, 13 F.R.D. 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Weisler
v. Matta, 95 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Nola Elec. Co. v. Reilly, 93 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). See generaly Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Ciil Procedures, 23 A.B.AJ. 629 (1937).
14. See Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971
(1966). See also White v. Secretary of HEW, 56 F.R.D. 497 (N.D.N.Y. 1972); Van Gundy v. Ellis,
246 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
Courts typically construe rule 4(d)(7) as a federal incorporation of state procedures in the man-
ner of serving process. By not specifically including within their interpretation of the rule a li-
cense to adopt state rules on who may serve process, courts may be seen as sub silentio requiring
that a rule 4(c) person continue to serve process regardless of the state procedures adopted. See,
ceg., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963); Heyman v. Kline, 344 F. Supp.
1081, 1085 (D. Conn. 1970), rerd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
47 (1972); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Molins Orgs., Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 436, 441 (E.D. Va.
1966).
15. The historical origins of service of process argue strongly for a rigid reading of rule 4(c).
William W. Blume, writing of this history, noted that "[t]he giving of notice being a substitute for
arrest on a capias, personal service cannot be accomplished unless the process server and the
person served are so situated that the one could arrest the other." W. BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL
PROCEDURE 275-76 (1955). See also Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Christopher Adams, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
571 (1835); United States v. Montgomery, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 335 (1795); 0. BumP, Bump's FEDERAL
PROCEDURE § 914 (1881); C. MONTGOMERY, MONTGOMERY'S MANUAL OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
§ 524 (2d ed. 1918); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064, at
206 (1969 & Supp. 1978); Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427 (1929).
Federal Equity Rule 15, the model for rule 4(c), also required personal service by select individ-
uals. The rule reads:
The service of all process, mesne and final, shall be by the marshal of the district, or his
deputy, or by some other person specially appointed by the court or judge for the pur-
pose, and not otherwise. In the latter case, the person serving the process shall make
affidavit thereof.
B. BABBITT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE AND EQUITY RULES 271 (1925).
16. See Smith v. United States, 403 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1968). See also Spry v. Eastern Gas &
Fuel Assocs., 234 F. Supp. 580, 581 (W.D. Pa. 1964), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Eastern Gas
& Fuel Ass'n v. Midwest-Raleigh, Inc., 374 F.2d 451 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 951 (1967);
Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1950); Sussan v. Strasser, 36 F. Supp. 266, 269
(E.D. Pa. 1941).
17. 34 F.R.D. 151 (D. Minn. 1964) (noted in 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 284, 288 (1966)).
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made pursuant to state law to rule 4(c) persons.18 In a garnishment
proceeding the court found that state law controlled the manner of
serving process and upheld personal service performed by any individ-
uals authorized by state law.19
The majority of cases, however, adopt a more moderate position.
These cases hold that when state law prescribes personal service, rule
4(c) determines who must perform the service.2' But when state law
allows service by posting, publishing, or mailing, these courts conclude
that it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff or the marshal serves process; 2I
thus "a marshal or any other person authorized to make service under
rule 4(c) need play no part in the process.122
To avoid inconsistent court rulings, the Advisory Committee's pro-
posed amendment chose the Ospina approach.23 Other alternatives,
however, were available. The Committee could have chosen to require:
(1) that only a rule 4(c) person make federal service of process regard-
less of the manner of service permitted by the operation of rules
4(d)(7), 4(e), or other federal rules; or (2) that personal service under
rules 4(d)(7), 4(e), or other federal rules be performed by a person au-
thorized by rule 4(c), but posted, published, or mailed service permitted
under the rules may be made by any individual authorized by state
law.
Of the three options, the Advisory Committee's proposal most radi-
cally changes the content of the service rules. The present rule 4(c)
18. Ospina v. Vanelli, 34 F.R.D. 151, 152 (D. Minn. 1964) (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 64).
See also Free State Receivables, Ltd. v. Claims Processing Corp., 76 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Md. 1977)
19. Ospina v. Vanelli, 34 F.R.D. 151, 152 (D. Minn. 1964), in which the court reasoned that
"[the rule specifically states that these remedies are available '. . . under the circumstances and
in the manner. . .' provided by State law. This seems to fairly indicate that this Court is to adopt
both the substantive and procedural law of Minnesota in regard to garnishment proceedings."
20. E.g., Veeck v. Commodity Enterprises, Inc., 487 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1973); Thompson v.
Battle, 54 F.R.D. 222, 225 (N.D. 111. 1971); Townsend v. Fletcher, 9 F.R.D. 711 (N.D. Ohio 1949);
2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 4.08, at 4-98 (2d ed. 1978); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1092, at 353 (1969 & Supp. 1978).
21. Wells v. English Elec., Ltd., 60 F.R.D. 573 (W.D. La. 1973) (adopting the dissent of
Judge Brown in Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 848-49 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied,
385 U.S. 971 (1966)).
22. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, at 354. Accord, Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 361 F.2d 838, 848-49 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); Farr
& Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de Nay. de Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957); 1 W. BARRON
& A. HOLTZOLFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 175, 182.1 (rev. ed. C. Wright 1960); 2
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.08 (2d ed. 1978).
23. See notes 1-3 & 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
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provides a balance between the need for effective24 and reliable service
(U.S. marshals) and the judicial discretion necessary for flexibility and
practical convenience (court appointments). Courts have used this
discretion either to allow appointments 26 or, when necessary, to insist
that a U.S. marshal serve process. 2 The Advisory Committee proposal
would strip the courts of their discretion by forcing them to adhere to
state laws and rules on the means of making service.2
This change seems unwise and unnecessary. Under present rule 4(c),
federal courts can rely on the validity of return of service made by U.S.
marshals.2 9 Courts treat the return of service as either a conclusive pre-
sumption of service,3 ° or as a rebuttable presumption overcome only by
24. Courts have held the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution to require that service
of process reasonably notify the party served of the pendency of the action. E.g., SEC v. Beisinger
Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15 (1977); Albert Levne Assocs., Inc. v. Hudson, 43 F.R.D. 392 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Tarbox v. Walters, 192 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1961); see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRCTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1074, at 292 (1969 & Supp. 1978). For illustrations of what
constitutes reasonable notice, see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314-35 (1950); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
25 See Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 842-43 n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S 971 (1966); PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES-CLEVELAND 203 (W.
Dawson ed. 1938) (remarks of Dean Charles E. Clark). Seegenerali',4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1091. at 351 (1969 & Supp. 1978); Sunderland, New Fed-
eral Rules of Ciil Procedure as Related to Judicial Procedures in Ohio, 13 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 22
(1939). Cf In re Evanishyn, I F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (court exceeded its discretion to ap-
point petitioner's attorney to serve process); Modric v. Oregon & N.W.R. Co., 25 F. Supp. 79 (D.
Or. 1938) (court lacked discretion to appoint more than one person).
26. See note 25 supra.
27. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Pug Sand & Gravel Corp., 51 F.R.D. 147 (D. Nev.
1970). In this case the court wrote:
While process which functions only as notice to a litigant or third party, the obligations
of the process server being completed when service is made, may appropriately be ac-
complished by any qualified person under court authorization, this is not so with respect
to process which invokes other duties and responsibilities subject to court supervision
and governed by federal statutes. The statutory requirements for bonding a United
States Marshal and his deputies (28 U.S.C. § 564), and statutory requirements regarding
collection and accounting for fees (28 U.S.C. § 572), the charges for levying upon and
keeping seized properties (28 U.S.C. § 1921), and the obligations with respect to judicial
sales (28 U.S.C. § 2001, et. seq.), for examples, are inapplicable to a person whose sole
official connection with court administration is a designation under Rule 4(c) as a person
qualified and authorized to make service.
Id. at 148.
2x. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
29. Affidavits must be submitted to verify service performed by special court appointees
under rule 4(c). FED. R. Ci'. P. 4(g).
30. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F. Supp. 677, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1958), affid, 276 F.2d 614
(3rd Cir. 1960). Cf Harriman v. Rockaway Beach Pier, 5 F. 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1880) (service stands
while marshal defends in an action for false return).
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"strong and convincing evidence."' I State experience with the affidavit
procedure does not warrant this high degree of trust. Abuses occur
with such frequency that "sewer service," or the fraudulent nonservice
of process, is often standard operating procedure.32 Faced with the
greater possibility of unreliable service, federal courts can either: (1)
give less evidential respect to affidavits, easing the burden of proof re-
quired to make a challenge and thus likely increasing litigation; or (2)
ignore the possibilities for abuse of service and accept the attendant ill
consequences.
The Advisory Committee's proposal does clarify rule 4-but at too
great a cost. The amendment eliminates valuable judicial discretion
and creates unreliability in service of process. The other possible pro-
posals, which continue service by rule 4(c) persons (at least in situations
involving personal service) not only eliminate the ambiguity of rule 4,
but also preserve judicial discretion and reliable service of process.
31. Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 414 (8th Cir. 1955). Accord, Halpert v. Appleby, 23
F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Publix Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bitar, 156 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1957).
32. See United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Tu-
erkheimer, Service of Process in New York City: A Proposed End to Unregulated Criminality, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1972); Comment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 414 (1971).
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